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         The Influence of Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Capital Structure Decisions of Chinese Listed Firms 
 
         By 





This paper examines the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure decisions of Chinese listed firms.  
 
Design/Methodology 
Using a large and more recent dataset consisting of 2386 Chinese listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012, we employ panel data and use 




We find that the proportion of independent directors and ownership concentration exert significant influence on the level of Chinese long-term 
debt ratios after controlling for firm-specific determinants and split share reforms. Further analysis separating our sample into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and privately- owned enterprises (POEs) suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the state leads to decrease in 







The finding implies that concentrated ownership in the hands of the state appears more efficient compared to their private counterparts in their 
monitoring role.  
 
Original Value 
This study extends prior literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences on capital structure, to the effects of 
within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. The paper contributes to the agency theory-capital structure discourse in an 
emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak. 
 





Capital structure decisions are among the most crucial corporate policy choices made by managers of a firm. This is because capital structure 
decisions are more prone to agency problems, affect the riskiness and performance of a firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the quality 
of corporate governance plays an important role in a firm’s financing choices as these decisions are made by senior managers with the board of 
directors having the responsibility of supervising and monitoring these decisions. However, emerging country firms are dominated by ownership 





et al., 2015; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). Zhou et al. (2015) note that when the emerging governments privatise state firms 
they generally retain controlling interests suggesting that corporate investment and financing decisions may be influenced by governments (see, 
Firth et al., 2008). Environments characterised by strong corporate governance provide a remedy to many agency problems (Mande et al., 2012; 
Berger et al., 1997). Conversely, firms in emerging economies which operate in weak corporate governance environments can influence a wide 
spectrum of business decisions that often result in higher agency costs (Yuan et al., 2009).  
In this paper, we extend prior literature of emerging country firms which has focused predominantly on leverage decisions on firm-specific 
factors (see Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006) by examining how within-firm governance mechanisms influence the capital 
structure decisions of Chinese-listed firms. Specifically, we test the effects of within-firm governance on the long-term debt ratios of Chinese 
firms and carry out further analysis on the difference between the state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private owned enterprises (POEs).  
As the world’s largest emerging economy, China has reformed and transformed itself from centrally planned socialist economy to a largely 
market-oriented economy. The transformation includes corporate governance reforms in 2001; the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 respectively. Despite the above reforms, China presents unique challenges for corporate governance practices 
for several reasons. First, Chinese firms, like their counterparts in other emerging countries, are noted for their lack of transparency and suffer 
from widespread corruption in the corporate sector. China is ranked 80
th
 out of 178 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index and collusion between individual businesses and agents of the state are rampant (Haß et al., 2014). Second, the institutional 





ownership structure, business practices and enforcement standards result in major gaps between the formal adoption of progressive governance 
codes and the actual implementation of these codes. While Chinese regulators may be quick to adopt best corporate governance practices from 
the West, the establishment of these practices and their implementation remain contested (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). We consider the 
effects of internal governance mechanisms (i.e., ownership concentration, CEO duality, and the percentage of independent directors) on capital 
structure choice in China because of the rudimentary level of legal protection given to shareholders in China compared to Western standards and 
the highly concentrated nature of ownership and weak corporate governance among institutions (Yuan et al., 2009). Consistent with the agency 
theory, we argue that the monitoring role of dominant shareholders and independent directors can potentially mitigate managers’ self-serving 
behaviour, and improve firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
This study contributes to the capital structure literature, which has concentrated disproportionately on firm-specific influences with relatively 
little attention being given to the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions. To the best of knowledge, only 
two studies, that is, Chang et al. (2014) and Wen et al. (2002) have examined the impact of corporate governance variables and capital structure 
decisions. However, Chang et al. (2014) analysed the impact of ownership types on capital structure over the period of 1998-2009 and did not 
consider the effects of within-firm governance mechanisms such as CEO duality and independent directors on capital structure decisions. The 
work of Wen et al. (2002) considered the effects of corporate governance mechanisms using a sample of 60 Chinese firms over the period of 
1996-1998 but before the split-share reforms in 2001 and 2005. The above is against the backdrop that Feinerman (2007); Wang, (2007) argue 





governance practices and policies of Chinese listed firms. The earlier study of Chen (2004) recognized the importance of institutions and called 
for studies involving variables which reflect governance and institutional influences on capital structure decisions. Mande et al. (2012) echoed 
similar views and pointed out that the existence of insider control and weak corporate governance system in emerging countries has implications 
for agency costs and the choice of financing. Responding to the call, this study contributes to the agency theory-capital structure discourse in an 
emerging country context where corporate governance system appears weak. To our knowledge, this study represents one of the first attempts to 
contribute to the literature on the effects of corporate governance on capital structure decisions by using a relatively larger and more recent 
dataset consisting of 2,386 Chinese listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2012. 
 
We do so by employing panel data and use different statistical methods (OLS, fixed effects, and system GMM) to examine the effects of within-
firm governance on capital structure to overcome endogeneity problem often associated with board effect variables (Boateng and Huang, 2017). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews background literature on the corporate governance reforms in 
China, a brief theoretical perspective of capital structure determinants and the hypotheses of study. Section three describes the data and 
methodology used in this study. Section four presents and discusses the results. Section five provides conclusions. 
 
2. Corporate Governance Background in China 





The last three decades has seen gradual but systematic economic reforms and integration of China into the world economy. With increasing 
integration and globalisation, China’s political leadership quickly recognised the need for Chinese firms to adopt international practices and 
good corporate governance rules to increase trade, economic ties with other countries and improve the corporate culture (Haß et al., 2014). As a 
result, a number of laws and regulations designed to improve corporate governance standards were passed by the Chinese government. 
Following the establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, China passed its first Company Law in 1993, which became effective in 
1994. In 1999, the Chinese Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) modified the 1993 law to highlight the importance of independent directors. 
However, the law fell short in several respects. For example, the appointment of independent directors applied only to overseas-listed firms and 
not domestic firms. For domestic-listed firms, the concept of independent directors was first introduced in the Guidelines on Company Chapter 
of Listed Companies (CSRC, 1997) as an optional provision in which a listed firm may appoint independent directors if necessary. CSRC (1997) 
specifies persons who may not hold the position of independent director, but the guidelines remain silent on the minimum number and the duties 
of independent directors (CSRC, 1997: p.117). In 1998, China enacted the Securities Law to regulate the stock markets. The Securities Law 
provided strict prohibition of unfair practices such as market manipulation and insider trading. A formal and comprehensive corporate 
governance code on independent directors was released in 2001. This law specifies several requirements for listed companies, such as the 
presence of independent directors on boards, adherence to strict information disclosure norms, and the protection of the rights of minority 





2003 (CSRC, 2001). The law also provided the guidelines concerning the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of different groups such as 
shareholders, boards of directors, and managers. In 2005, further governance reforms including non-tradable share reforms followed. 
Despite the reforms and recognition that corporate governance practices are crucially important for firms and investment growth in China, it 
appears that China has a long way to go before its corporate governance systems meet the Western standards. For example, according to a 2002 
McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey, investors on average are willing to pay a 25% premium for well-governed Chinese firms (Barton et al., 
2004). In addition, a report by Asian Corporate Governance Association (Gill and Allen, 2007) placed China near the bottom in governance 
standards among 11 Asian markets. Other recent studies such as Qian and Yeung (2015) support the contention that weak corporate governance 
system permeates the corporate culture in China. 
 
3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Determinants of capital structure have been explained by three theoretical models, namely, the static trade-off theory, the pecking order theory 
and agency theory. The static trade-off theory states that a value-maximising firm will pursue an optimal capital structure by considering the 
marginal costs and benefits of each additional unit of financing, choosing the combination of debt and equity financing that equates marginal 
costs and benefits (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Under the trade-off theory the optimal capital structure is determined by balancing tax savings from 





existence of information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, new investments are financed first by retained profits, then by low 
risk debt if internally generated funds prove insufficient, and external equity as a last resort. Under the pecking order theory, changes in debt 
ratios are driven by the need for external funds, not by an attempt to reach an optimal capital structure (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1991).  
Prior literature examining the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure have drawn extensively on agency theory to 
explain the financing decisions of a firm (e.g. Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger et al., 1997; Wen et al., 2002). One line of research examines the 
effects of corporate governance on leverage decisions from the lens of principal-principal conflict (see Faccio et al., 2010; Morellec et al., 2012; 
Liu and Tian, 2012). These studies argue that ownership of listed firms in emerging countries are concentrated in the hands of large shareholders 
often SOEs (La Porta et al., 1999; Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Concentrated ownership coupled with the absence of effective external governance 
mechanisms leads to conflicts between the controlling and minority shareholders in financing decisions (Liu and Tian, 2012; Boateng and Huang, 
2017). For example, Faccio et al. (2010) demonstrate how firm leverage in countries with a weak legal system enables controlling shareholders 
to deploy borrowed resources for their own benefits at the expense of minority shareholders without bearing fully the financial distress cost. 
Paligorova and Xu (2012) therefore point out that higher leverage provides resources for controlling shareholders with excess control rights to 
engage in tunnelling activities. In addition, higher leverage is related to higher risk, higher cost of capital and heightens chances of financial 






An alternative perspective is that managers make capital structure decisions to increase their own wealth at the expense of debtholders and 
shareholders. It is therefore argued that capital structure decision of a firm is influenced not only by firm-specific factors and market frictions 
such as firm size, asset tangibility, earnings volatility, bankruptcy cost and tax but also by the severity of manager-shareholder conflict (Wen et 
al., 2002; Morellec et al., 2012). Consequently, a number of studies have focused on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
such as board size, managerial ownership, CEO compensation, board composition and corporate financing decisions of firms mostly in the 
context of developed market economies where ownership of firms is widely dispersed with relatively good corporate governance systems. 
Overall, prior literature emphasises the importance of internal corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms in reducing agency problems. 
For example, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that good corporate governance systems lessen agency costs and the cost of debt financing. 
This is because effective corporate governance mechanisms lead to efficient utilization of resources by managers, reduce default risk, thereby 
lowering the cost of debt. In summary, effective governance alleviates information asymmetry by ensuring the release of credible financial 
information (Ajinkya et al. 2005) and restrains managers from using private information for their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders/bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984). A number of studies have rendered some support for the above 
contention and indicate that corporate governance structures play a significant role in the capital structure decisions of listed firms (Morellec et 
al., 2012).  
In the context of China, Wen et al. (2002) study is one of the first attempts to examine the relationship between corporate board characteristics 





directors and longer CEO tenure but statistically insignificant relationship between board size and fixed CEO compensation. The results that 
lower leverage is associated with the percentage of outside directors and CEO tenure appear consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (1997). 
In contrast, Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) found significant relationship between leverage and both board size and composition. It is important to 
point out that the study by Wen et al. (2002) was carried before the split share reforms in 2005 and also did not consider the ownership 
concentration and CEO duality. Given the relatively weak corporate governance systems in China where high ownership concentration and state 
ownership are prevalent (La Porta et al., 1999), we believe that the agency cost perspective provides a valuable insight into how firms are 
financed. Drawing from agency theory, we formulate the following hypotheses.  
 
3.1 Ownership Concentration 
It is documented that concentrated ownership has a palpable impact on a firm’s financing decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is argued 
that ownership concentration leads to efficient monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The effect of ownership concentration on a firm’s 
financial decisions is premised on the fact that higher concentration gives large shareholders stronger incentives and greater power to monitor 
management at a lower cost. This argument is consistent with the view of Grossman and Hart (1986) who contend that shareholders with a large 
stake in the company show more willingness to play an active role in corporate decision-making because they partially internalize the benefits of 
their monitoring efforts. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that ownership concentration helps in disciplining managers and improves firm 





reduce leverage as entrenched managers tend to borrow more than optimal amount of debt in order to inflate their voting power to reduce 
possibility of takeover attempts (Harris and Raviv, 1988). Wen et al. (2002) in the study of 60 Chinese listed firms tentatively concluded that 
managers seek lower leverage when faced with stronger monitoring. In light of the argument, we hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership concentration is negatively related to the long-term debt ratio of Chinese firms. 
 
3.2 Independent Directors 
Agency theory suggests that the monitoring of management is enhanced by outside and independent directors. Prominent among the studies 
that document the effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring managerial actions regarding the firms’ corporate financing decisions 
include Lin et al. (1998); Feinerman (2007). These studies argue that senior managers are rigorously monitored when independent or outside 
directors constitute a higher proportion of board of directors thereby causing managers to adopt lower leverage to avoid excessive risk and 
disciplining role associated with debt. Thus, agency theory suggests that the relationship between a higher proportion of independent directors 
and long-term debt ratios will be negative while the converse has a positive effective.  
In the context of China, Knowledge@Wharton (2007) point out that it is difficult for Chinese firms to get the services of qualified 
independent directors because of the limited availability of such directors. Dharwadkar et al. (2000) and Feinerman (2007) share similar views 





China reflects the characteristics of Chinese society: its collectivist culture, social harmony, socialist politics and the associated political 
connections (Chen et al., 2011). The boards of Chinese firms are predominantly insiders with political connections as most Chinese listed 
companies have evolved from state owned enterprises (SOEs). Board of directors are often undermined by its composition and truly independent 
directors appear to be few and ineffective (Dahya et al., 2003; Wang, 2007). In the light of the above argument, we hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: Long term debt ratio is positively related to the percentage of outside directors on the board. 
3.3 CEO Duality 
Mallette and Fowler (1992) argue that CEO duality leads to the concentration of the power in the hands of one person thereby rendering the 
board’s monitoring role ineffective. Empirical evidence suggests that strong CEO power promotes CEO entrenchment and diminishes the ability 
of the board to execute its oversight role (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Fama (1980) argue that entrenched managers may prefer less leverage 
than optimal amount because of a desire to reduce firm risk to protect their under-diversified human capital. In line with the above reasoning, we 
expect a negative relationship between CEO duality and long-term debt ratios.   
Hypothesis 3: Long term debt ratio is negatively related to CEO duality. 
 





We control a number of firm-specific variables which prior literature on capital structure indicate have explanatory power on capital 
structure decisions under both static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. These include: 
Firm Size: Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that larger firms tend to be more diversified and are less likely to go bankrupt. The lower risk of 
bankruptcy and the ability of large firms to issue debt at a lower cost enable them to take on more debt than otherwise identical smaller firms.  
Asset Tangibility: Previous studies by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) have shown that tangibility of assets is an 
important factor influencing leverage.  
Profitability: The pecking-order theory suggests a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. Consistent with this theory, Titman 
and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) found profitability to be inversely related to financial leverage. 
Non Debt Tax Shield: DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. As a 
result, firms with larger non-debt tax shields would be expected to use less debt. Huang and Song (2006) find total debt to be negatively related 
to non-debt tax shields in China. 
Growth Opportunities (Tobin’s Q): Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that the agency problems are likely to be more severe for firms in 
growing industries because they have more flexibility in the choice of their future investment opportunities. As a result, a negative relationship 
between growth (investment) opportunities and financial leverage is expected.  
Earnings Volatility: Leverage increases the volatility of net profit. Firms that have high operating risk tend to mitigate this risk by reducing the 





Split Share Structure Reform: A number of authors argue that because of the split share structure, stock markets in China are illiquid and firms 
rely heavily on debt financing (Berger et al., 2009). In April 2005-December, 2007, Chinese government carried out a split share reforms to 
improve the liquidity in Chinese stock marks and reduce transaction costs of equity finance. In recent study, Tsai et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
the split share structure reforms decrease debt ratios of Chinese firms. We control for the effect of split share structure reforms using s dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 equals the years after the split structure reform; 0 equals otherwise.  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data for this study was obtained from the Chinese Stock Market Research (CSMAR) databases, commercially available at Shenzhen 
GTA Information Technology Company Ltd. CSMAR is a premier Chinese database jointly produced by the University of Hong-Kong and GTA 
and the database covers the governance and finance structure of listed Chinese mainland firms. The following restrictions were imposed in order 
to arrive at the final sample: (1) firms with any missing observations for any variable in the model during the period 1998–2012 are excluded. (2) 
firms in the financial sector are excluded from the sample because of the nature of their operations and financial reporting system. The above 
restrictions led to a final sample of 2386 Chinese-listed firms out of the initial sample of 2580 on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
 





Our dependent variable is the firm’s long-term debt ratio (LLEV) which is defined as long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus the 
book value of equity. The explanatory variables include profitability, size, growth opportunities, tangibility, earnings volatility, non-debt tax 
shields, split-share reforms, CEO duality, independent directors and ownership concentration. The manners in which the variables in this study 
are measured are provided in Table 1.  
  
      (Insert Table 1 here) 
4.3 Empirical Model 
Following previous studies that examine the determinants of firm capital structure choice (e.g. Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004), we 
employed OLS and fixed effects models in this article. Hsiao (1985) argues that the use of panel data provides a greater data points and improve 
the efficiency of econometrics estimates. For example, incorporating information relating to both cross-section and time-series variables reduce 
the problems that occur when there is an omitted-variable problem because it is unlikely that the capital structure models are fully specified 
(Guney et al., 2011). Previous studies point out that, for example, there are no available proxies for such factors such as industry effects or 
magnitude of financial distress costs. However, using fixed effects method would potentially control for the unobservable firm-specific factors 
but it would not alleviate the endogeneity problem (Istaitieg and Rodriguez, 2006). To mitigate the distortions caused by fixed effects, and the 





The basic model is specified as follows: 
      𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   𝑖 = 1, … 1681;  𝑡 = 1 … 11        (1) 
where i denotes the cross-section dimension and t indicates the time dimension, 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 
is a 1 x k vector of observations on k explanatory variables for the ith firm in the tth period,  is a k x 1 vector of parameters, itu  is a disturbance 
term and is defined as 
itiitu    where i  denotes the unobservable individual effect and it  denotes the remainder disturbance. 
 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 summarises the mean, standard deviation and a correlation matrix. All correlations are relatively low and variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is below the acceptable level of 10. This correlation matrix suggests that multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in this study. 
The mean book value debt ratio of Chinese listed firms is about 53% compared to the mean of 66% for G-7 countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
However, the Chinese debt ratio appears to be slightly higher than the average total book value debt level of 51% in developing countries overall 
(Booth et al., 2001). Independent directors in the sample constitute about 35% of the proportion of board members and CEO duality is about 






       (Insert Table 2 here) 
 
5. Regression Results 
5.1 OLS and Fixed Effects Results 
Table 3 reports the regression results using both the OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimation techniques. For the corporate governance 
variables, both OLS and FE results suggest that the ownership concentration and proportion of independent directors exert significant negative 
and positive influence on the level of debt utilised by Chinese listed firms at respectively. The fixed effect model (ownership concentration: β = -
0.0004399; p<0.01) and (independent directors: β = 0.0161625; p<0.01) are negatively and positively significant, respectively. These results are 
similar to the OLS model. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are therefore supported by the OLS and FE models. The coefficient for CEO duality for both OLS 
and FE (β = -0.0302463; β= -0.0078555; p<0.01) is negatively and significantly related to the debt ratio rendering some support for Hypothesis 3.  
Regarding the control variables, we find firm size (β = 1.21e-10; p<0.01) and asset tangibility (β = 0.05431; p<0.01) have positive 
coefficient while profitability (β = -5.53e-07; p<0.01); and split share reforms (β = -0.0199986; p<0.01) have negative and significant influence 
on long-term debt ratio. Both OLS and FE results indicate that firm size (SIZE) and firms with higher collateral (TANG) tend to borrow more 





Regarding the split structure reform, our results suggest that the split-share reform has a negative and significant effect on the debt ratio of 
Chinese listed firms. However, earnings volatility and growth opportunities have insignificant influence on the use of long-term debt. It is 
pertinent to point out that the results imply that the magnitude and significant levels of coefficient estimates are in some cases sensitive to the 
choice of econometric method. For example, while OLS reveal that profitability is not significantly related to the debt ratio, the FE shows that 
profitability is significantly related to long-term debt at the 1% level.  
 
  (Insert Table 3 here please) 
 
5.2 System GMM (SGMM) Results  
The previous section assumed that capital structure choice of Chinese firms is static. However, a more realistic assumption would be that 
managers adjust their financing mix due to internal changes or external shocks (see Antoniou et al., 2008). Our SGMM estimation accounts for 
such considerations and the results are reported in Table 4. While OLS and fixed effects methods produce slightly different results, the SGMM 
results based on dynamic capital structure analysis settle the contradictions. The findings of the SGMM regression indicate that internal 
governance mechanisms influence the choice of capital structure in China. The ownership concentration (β = -0.0087401; p<0.05) and 





respectively. The positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and level of long-term debt for Chinese listed firms 
suggests that the presence of independent directors increases the debt ratios of Chinese firms. The results call into question the effectiveness of 
the monitoring role of independent directors in the Chinese firm financial decisions (see Dahya et al., 2003). Another interesting finding is the 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and long-term debt ratios. The result appears consistent to the notion that ownership 
concentration gives large shareholders stronger incentives and greater power to monitor management and reduce debt levels, even if, there is a 
failure of the monitoring role of the independent directors or in the presence of a weak governance system (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). This finding also appears to render support to the conclusion drawn by Boateng and Huang (2017) that concentrated 
ownership reduces the adoption of excess leverage by Chinese firms. However, CEO duality appears to have a negative coefficient which is 
insignificant.  
 
                      (Insert Table 4 here please) 
 
Regarding the control variables, our results indicate that split share reforms, firm size, asset tangibility and non-debt tax shields have 
significant influence on long-term. The SGMM results confirm the findings in OLS and fixed effect regression models. The results of the firm-





has a positive and significant impact on long-term debt ratios supports the trade-off model which indicates that large firms tend to have a higher 
debt capacity because of greater diversification, less risk to lenders and economies of scale. The positive and significant effect of asset tangibility 
on debt ratio appears to support the pecking order theory. The positive coefficient of non-tax debt shields (NDTS) seems to render some support 
to the findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and is in line with the trade-off theory. However, this result is at variance with that of Huang and Song 
(2006) who found that the Chinese firms’ debt ratios decrease with NDTS. The relationship between the long-term debt ratio and volatility is 
negative and insignificantly different from zero. This result is also at odds with the results of previous research (Booth et al., 2001). Profitability 
has a negative and significant effect on debt ratio suggesting that higher profitability (ROA) tends to increase debt ratio for Chinese firms. This 
finding is consistent to the findings of Chen (2004) and supports the pecking order theory. We find that growth opportunity (Tobin’s Q) appears 
not to have a significant impact on the debt ratio of Chinese listed firms contrary to the findings of Huang and Song (2006) who document a 
negative and significant influence of Tobin’s Q on debt ratio for Chinese firms. The split share structure reform appears to have a negative and 
significant influence on debt ratio. Perhaps the results may be explained by the fact that, after the reform, the liquidity of the stock market 
improved as non-tradable shares were converted into tradable shares thereby reducing the reliance of debt finance from banks which dominate 
Chinese financial markets (see Berger et al., 2009). 
   





Previous studies indicate state ownership is an important feature in China despite massive reforms (Du and Boateng, 2015). To shed lights on the 
effects of ownership type and seek direct evidence to strengthen our interpretation of the effect of ownership concentration on debt ratio, we 
carried out a sub-sample analysis. We do so by dividing the sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs) 
for the following reasons. First, ownership structure represents a source of power in a firm and can be used to either support or constrain 
corporate finance decisions and influence firm value (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Du and Boateng, 2015). Second, ownership concentration in 
the hands of state ownership and private ownership may have different implications for capital structure decisions. It is argued that SOEs tend to 
be politically rather than commercially motivated, which might induce soft budget constraints and provide some support for state controlled 
firms (Poncet et al., 2010). Soft budget constraints may provide easier access to external finance for firms and it is documented that SOEs have 
less financial constraints compared to POEs in China (Zhou et al., 2015). We therefore test whether there are variations in the impact of factors 
influencing the financing choice according to ownership types in China. 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that whereas the ownership concentration has a negative and significant influence on the debt ratios 
of SOEs, this appears not be the case of POEs. This appears surprising because it was anticipated that SOEs in China which tend to have 
political objectives might induce soft budget constraints and provide some support for state controlled firms as pointed out by Poncet et al. 
(2010). However, this appears not be the case. Perhaps, this finding may be explained by the fact that ownership concentration in the hands of 
the state has a better capacity to perform effective monitoring role thereby providing an efficient way of resolving agency problems between 





up firms in which they have dominant shares through grants or increase in equity capital rather than the use of debt capital due to the political 
and social goals associated with these firms. 
 
      (Inset Table 5 here please) 
 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
To check for the overall robustness of the empirical results, we implement a number of robustness checks on our main results in Tables 3 & 4. 
First, we explore alternative measures of return on equity for profitability and the natural log of sales for firm size. Our analysis suggests the 
results are not sensitive to the changes in measurements of variables. As a further check on the validity of our interpretations, the study 
employed a regression specification that used overall leverage (LEV) as dependent variable. The results which are not reported here but 







This paper employs within-firm governance mechanisms and control firm-specific factors to investigate the capital structure decisions of 
2386 Chinese listed firms. This paper reports some interesting and significant results. First, we find that within-firm governance mechanisms, 
namely, independent directors and ownership concentration have significant impact on the debt ratio of Chinese listed firms. The positive and 
significant relationship between the independent directors and long-term debt ratio indicates that the proportion of independent directors 
increases with long-term debt ratio in China. An important implication of this finding is that independent directors who have an institutional 
mandate to monitor the board in China appear to be less effective in their monitoring role, perhaps due to lack of capacity as suggested by Dahya 
et al. (2003). We suggest that, firms should not only engage qualified personnel as directors but resource them with requisite training through 
refresher courses to make them more capable of carrying out their monitoring mandate. To the policy makers, we suggest that the proportion of 
independent directors should be increased from one-third to one-half of board members in line with many advanced countries such as the United 
Kingdom. 
Regarding the negative relationship between the ownership concentration and long-term debt ratios, this finding implies that concentrated 
ownership leads to efficient monitoring and in particular, concentration in the hands of SOEs appears more efficient compared to their 
counterparts in POEs in their monitoring role. It appears concentration of ownership in the hands of the state which has a capacity to finance 
these firms internally for political and social objectives. This implies that despite substantial improvements in the governance environment and 





Regarding the influence of firm-specific determinants of capital structure, our results suggest that size and asset tangibility exert positive and 
significant influence on the debt ratios of Chinese firms. However, growth opportunity and earnings volatility appear not to have significant 
impact on long-term debt ratios of Chinese listed firms. The study also extends the previous studies in emerging countries such as Chen (2004) 
and Huang and Song (2006) by examining the capital structure choice after major enterprise and governance reforms in the largest emerging 
country. The insights regarding these factors could help predict the financial structure of a firm in China and other emerging countries. While 
this paper has provided significant insights into capital structure choice of Chinese listed firms, the paper has some limitations. Due to the 
unavailability of data, SOEs in this paper refer to firms controlled by both central and local governments. It would have been useful to divide 
SOEs into those controlled by the central government and those controlled by local government as pointed out by Chen et al. (2009). More 
studies therefore appear warranted. Future studies should explore and compare the influence of corporate governance factors on capital structure 
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 Table 1: Measurement of Independent variables 
Variables Measures Sign Theoretical Justification 
Overall Leverage 
(LEV) 










Within –Firm Governance Variables:  
  
CEO Duality (CEO) CEO as chair =1; Otherwise= 0 +/- Agency Theory 
Ownership  
Concentration  
Percentage of shares held by top 5 
shareholders           




Number of independent director divided 
by the number of board membership 
+/- Agency Theory 
Control Variables:   
Profitability (ROA) Earnings before interest and tax divided 
by total assets 
+/- Pecking order 




Tobin’s Q is market to book ratio of total 
assets. Market value of total assets is 
book value of total liabilities plus market 
value of equity 
 
+ Trade-off/Signalling 
 Tangibility (TANG)  ratio of tangible assets (the sum of fixed 
assets and inventories) to total assets 
+/- Pecking order/Trade off 
 Earnings Volatility 
(VOL)  
Standard deviation of earnings before 
interest and tax 
+/- Trade off 
 Non-Debt Tax 
Shields (NDTS) 
 
Split Share structure 
reform 
Depreciation and amortization divided by 
total assets 
 
Dummy variable value taking of 1= 2005-

















                                              Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation Matrix 
 
  Mean  S.D.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.LEV 0.532 0.91467                     
2. ROA 2.1588 2.9839 -0.0067 
        
  
3. Asset tangibility 0.4638 0.1796 0.234** -0.0262* 
       
  
4. Firm size 21.3725 1.3049 0.318** -0.0876** 0.1869** 
      
  
5. Earnings Volatility 8.9133 1.6665 -0.0065 -0.0004 -0.0059 -0.0033 
     
  
6. Non-debt tax shield 0.0570 2.1988 -0.0093 0.6721** -0.0353** -0.1248** -0.0007 
    
  
7. Growth opportunities 4.8735 0.9357 0.0049 0.0001 -0.0022 0.0084 0.0006 0.0000 
   
  
8. Independent  director % 0.3515 0.0538 0.0145 0.0110 -0.0375** 0.0189*  0.0230* 0.0045 0.0030 
  
  
9. Duality/ CEO ( =1)  0.0006 0.0241 -0.0061 -0.0003 -0.0260 -0.0190 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0160 
 
  
10. Ownership concentration 38.4129 16.1825 0.0506** -0.0148 0.0978** 0.2573** -0.0074 -0.0200 -0.0130 -0.0430** -0.0137   
11. Split share structure  0.4246 0.4943 -0.0271* -0.0097 0.0587** -0.0242* -0.0051 0.0019 0.0121 0.0289** 0.0125 -0.0448** 
 
Note: LEV = overall leverage; ROA = return on assets; Mean and standard deviations       









      Table 3: Determinants of capital structure of Chinese Firms (1998-2012) 
Notes:  Dependent variable is Long-term leverage (LTLEV). The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are 
reported in the parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant null 
is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  All specifications include the full set of time and two-













Independent Variables  Pooled OLS Fixed Effect 
ROA  2.13E-06 (7.68E-06) -5.53E-07 (6.54E-06)*** 
Growth Opportunities 
( Tobin’s Q) 
7.89E-07 (1.45E-06 ) -3.69e-07 (1.23E-06) 
Asset tangibility 0.127779 (.0072405 )***    .05431 (0.0077 )*** 
 Firm size 1.42E-10 (4.23E-11)*** 1.21e-10 (9.47E-11 )*** 
Earnings Volatility  -3.14E-08 (8.44E-08)    2.68e-09 (7.67E-08  ) 
Non-debt tax shield  0.0001459 (.0008167 ) 0.000139 (0.00070 ) 
Split share reform -0.0291285 (0.003057)*** -.0199986 (0.0028)*** 
 Independent directors 0.0258802 (0.0208005)* 0.0161625 (0242632)*** 
 CEO Duality   -0.0302463 (0.0029928)*** -0.0078555 (0.004  )*** 
Ownership concentration  -0.0000287 (0.0000678)** -0.0004399 (0.00011)*** 
Constant   -0.6814598 (0.0481277)*** -.5861278 (0.0455 )*** 
Firms/observations 2386 / 14886 2386 / 14886 
Adjusted R 0.1308 0.1298 























   
Notes: Dependent variable is Lag Long-term leverage (LTLEV). The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
are reported in the parentheses. Wald statistic tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second 
order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of 
no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) 
under the null of instruments' validity. We tested for the endogeneity of firm-specific factors and corporate 
governance using the ‘Difference-in- Sargan-Hansen" statistic, for which the null hypothesis states that the 
variable is exogenous. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant null is 












Independent Variables  System GMM 
L. LTLEV  0.7872 ( 0 .0254 )*** 
ROA -7.28E-07 (2.39E-07 )*** 
Growth Opportunities ( Tobin’s Q) 1.39E-07 ( 1.51E-07 ) 
L. Growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) 3.67E-07 ( 2.21E-07 ) 
Asset tangibility 0.02412 ( 0.0075 )*** 
 Firm size 2.46E-11 ( 1.70E-11)*** 
Earnings Volatility  -9.50E-09 ( 1.57E-08 ) 
Non-debt tax shield   9.47E-07 ( 0.000368 ) 
L. Non-debt tax shield  0.0000867 ( .0000492 )* 
 Independent  directors 0.0174638 ( .0155319 )** 
 CEO Duality   -8.79E-06 (.0000874 ) 
Ownership concentration   -0.0087401 (0.0017983)** 
Split Share Reforms -0.048612 ( 0.0027434 )** 
Constant  0.0014034 ( .0085862 ) 
Firms/observations  2347/13397 
Wald Test    3332.5*** 
AR(1)     -7.9153*** 
AR(2)    -074387 (04570) 






Table 5: Dynamic GMM Results: Determinants of capital structure of Chinese SOE versus POE  
Notes:  Dependent variable is Lag Long-term leverage (LTLEV). The standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. Wald statistic tests the joint significance of estimated 
coefficients; asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first 
and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed 
as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. We tested for the endogeneity of firm-specific factors and 
corporate governance using the ‘Difference-in- Sargan-Hansen" statistic, for which the null hypothesis states 
that the variable is exogenous. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant 
null is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 SOE POE 
   
L. LTLEV 0.6140461 (0.022691)*** .5771507  ( .0150691 )*** 
ROA  -0.0122184  (0.0034258 )*** -1.51e-07 ( 4.32E-07 ) 
Growth Opportunities (Tobin’s Q) 7.33E-06 (7.76E-06) -7.73e-08 (1.53E-07 ) 
L.Growth Opportunities (Tobin’s Q) 1.93E-07  (7.40e-06 ) 7.77e-08 (3.22E-07 ) 
Asset tangibility -0.0002792 (0.0124747 ) .0240223 (0.0183301 ) 
Firm size -1.45E-10 (1.58E-10 )*** 1.55E-10 (3.53E-10)*** 
Earnings Volatility 1.69E-08 (1.10E-08 ) 1.80E-07 (5.59E-07 ) 
Non-debt tax shield -0.1844096 (0.059953 ) 0.0000911 (0.0000921 ) 
L.Non-debt tax shield -0.2765249(0.1154917) 0.0000586 (0.0001445 ) 
Split share reforms -0.0099948 (0.0066138 )*** -0.0071033 (0.00383)** 
Independent  directors 0.0214613 (0.024878 ) 0.0226501  (0.0319838 ) 
 CEO Duality   -0.0010139 (0.0050585 ) -0.00172  (0.0043819 ) 
Ownership concentration  -0.003246 (0.000218 )*** 0.004251 (0.0002624 ) 
Constant  0.026573 ( .0154674 )* 
 
-.013267 (0.0173989 )*** 
 
Wald 1070.48*** 6.82E-08 *** 
AR(1) -9.6451*** -3.9317 ** 
AR(2) 1.6321(0.1027) -0.27111 ( 0.7863 ) 
Sargan test (p) 108.3519*** 149.9861 *** 
Firms/observations 1174 /8008   1342 / 5114 
